Cover image courtesy of Invisible Children.
The organization Invisible Children became anything but invisible in 2012 with the release of Kony 2012, a film by the organization’s founders. It advocated for the capture of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony and was the center of great controversy with claims of sensationalism, oversimplification of a complex conflict, and glorifying Kony by drawing so much attention to him. All of this led to financial difficulties and shame for Invisible Children. Kony was the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army responsible for unspeakable atrocities in the African nation of Uganda and other parts of Central Africa, and Invisible Children has invested heavily in their goal of ending this reign of terror in the region. Formed in 2004, Invisible Children saw eight years of activism before the film release. This period was not without criticism with questions over proper finance procedures and the direct impact on actual Ugandans achieved from the organization’s efforts, but none was as public and immense as the crisis faced after Kony 2012. Ultimately the only move left was to drastically restructure the whole operation, and this essay seeks to explain how such public backlash can fundamentally change the goals and methods of even a group with previously clear and adamant goals. In the case of Invisible Children, this transition led to a new focus of more general “on the ground” activism. This essay will begin with an overview of the history and work of Invisible Children, followed by an analysis of the criticisms before and after Kony 2012. It will then explain how critique and controversy led to largely forced transition and how this transition impacted citizens in Central Africa and has led to the potential for better, more responsible activism in the future.
Invisible Children Background
The Invisible Children official website discusses how the United Nations called the crisis in Uganda the most neglected in the world and that they established their organization in response. Some background into the conflict clarifies the complexity of the situation. A group called the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), under the leadership of Joseph Kony, was responsible for 2,400 attacks, 8,374 abductions, and 3,175 deaths throughout Central Africa since 2008. The LRA began activity in 1988 in Northern Uganda formed from the earlier Holy Spirit Movement. Joseph Kony swept in during the fall out of resistance movements in the north and became the LRA officially in 1992. They rebelled against the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni early on and continued their future conquests in the name of the bible. They are well known for abducting and forcing civilians to fight their battles and some governments, including Uganda, have been accused of supporting the LRA. Kony has received indictments for crimes against humanity and war crimes from the International Criminal Court but these have had little impact on his actions. December 2008 brought a union of Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo to find Kony but largely failed. Similarly, in 2009 President Barack Obama signed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and in 2011 deployed 100 advisors and in 2013 150 troops, but none proved successful in Kony’s capture. [2]
The young founders of Invisible Children became aware of all of this and wanted to bring attention to the issue. And so Invisible children was formed to encourage people to look beyond their own borders to help those in need, with the main method being a reliance on social media and grassroots activism. Bringing attention to the specific people impacted and using “storytelling, youth idealism, and human empathy” would ideally mobilize support for this cause and entice foreign powers to get involved.[3] Three film students–Jason Russell, Lauren Poole, and Bobby Bailey–made the original film Invisible Children: Rough Cut focused on “night walkers”, Northern Ugandan children who walked and hid at night to avoid LRA capture.
The mission statement at the time was to “raise awareness and [educate] the U.S. about the atrocities, exploitation and abuse of invisible children throughout the world.” [4] They used the money for a national tour in 2006, and the Global Night Commute rally which brought 80,000 Americans together in 130 cities. Celebrities also became involved with features on the popular television show Veronica Mars and a music video by Fall Out Boy. [5] Invisible Children relied on the idea of some NGOs that they should function like the for-profit world in order to do the most good. According to the Washington Post in a reflective 2014 article, such market-based models “prioritize surplus-centered risk and large investments in personnel as a way of generating the largest possible return on their investment.” [6] Ultimately this business model and renewed fear of Kony and the LRA prompted the organization to create the film Kony 2012 which led to the restructuring of the entire operation. Before delving into that, it is important to acknowledge the criticism which existed before 2012.
Pre-Kony 2012 Criticism
Throughout the organization’s history, donations had come in large part from traveling tours promoting the cause in high schools and colleges. I myself still have the black and red Invisible Children bracelet pictured below which I purchased at one such event at my high school.
We were told they were made in Uganda and would directly benefit children there. I viewed this presentation in 2008 and so before Kony 2012, but I remember sitting in my high school auditorium watching video of child soldiers and feeling an urge to help children my age who I did not and would never know, and yet still felt a connection to somehow. These efforts seemed noble in my high school brain but as I have learned more about humanitarianism and its pitfalls, I have come to understand and support many criticisms of the organization. Humanitarianism is at its core “an urge to help humans” which can be seen here, but it can serve interests beyond this and Invisible Children was accused of financial mismanagement and self-interest. [7]
The organization was charged with using images of the children to sell merchandise and garner attention. Critics of using images of children in general have satirically written things like “you must always include The Starving African, who wanders the refugee camp nearly naked, and waits for the benevolence of the West.” [8] Invisible Children placed a large focus on images like these with the whole campaign essentially implying a need for rescue and salvation. They were also known for appealing to youth to radicalize them in a sense toward becoming humanitarians themselves. But critics agreed Invisible Children did this “through an historical narrative of self-discovery, ignoring any structural or historical contextualization of the crisis in Uganda.” [9]
Between 2007 and 2010 program expenses were divided between US events and actual programs in Uganda but the US side had a much larger share which led to public scrutiny. A group called Visible Children found that only 32 percent of aid went directly to helping Ugandans while the remainder paid for staff, travel, and production. Invisible Children shot back claiming they needed to spend this money on advocacy as it would ultimately pay off. [10] Much money was spent on the ground but a larger share did go to financing tours and public appearances for staff. The organization was struggling financially and most of the money came from merchandise sales at these tour events. They acknowledge that they simplified things in the presentations but claim it was intentional so that more people would become interested. Still, critics felt it was wrong of white Americans to step in and use such propaganda to fix a problem many Ugandans felt they could fix on their own. The government claimed they had successfully pushed the LRA out of Uganda with the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces in 2006 and thus felt they did not need the help of young American filmmakers. Writer Dinaw Mengestu stated “To claim [the children] were invisible because a group of college students traveling through Uganda happened to stumble upon a war they were too ignorant to have known of before going to the region is, to put it mildly, patronizing.” Invisible Children claimed that they did work with many locals who have lived through the conflict but the criticism that they lacked understanding of the complexities of the situation stood. [11] Africa is often described as monolithic and an idea and figment of the western imagination wherein Westerners operate on limited actual knowledge, a problem which can be applied to this situation. [12]
Kony 2012 Backlash
The Kony 2012 video was controversial and perhaps that is partly why, despite criticisms, it did see some success.[13] According to NPR, it was viewed a hundred million times in five days and helped Invisible Children to raise more than thirty million dollars.[14] The film showcased the invisible children, but the overall message was clear: capture Joseph Kony at all costs. It advocated for the posting of images and leaflets about this message all over to raise awareness. Much of the criticism of the film centered on its simplification of the conflict. It is easier to sensationalize and create connections when a story is simple and relatable. Invisible Children was charged with creating the narrative they wanted about the LRA based on the population they wished to speak directly to. Announcements from the organization often contained boasts of drastic lowering of the number of displaced persons which many fact checking organizations found to be wholly untrue. This simplification also places all blame for deaths and violence on the LRA, ignoring any role the Ugandan government may have played. [15]
Author Teju Cole called out Invisible Children post Kony 2012, accusing its founders and supporters of “the white-savior industrial complex.” She stated that “If we are going to interfere in the lives of others, a little due diligence is a minimum requirement.” Cole felt that the organization claimed to care but really was just in it for the awards and their own emotional experience, claiming enthusiasm was not enough to tackle this problem. Those impacted by the Ugandan crisis had not been consulted enough by Invisible Children and their agency had not been considered. Like many other humanitarian organizations, Invisible Children assumed Africans could not help themselves. Cole cautioned that focusing an entire campaign on one individual–Joseph Kony–took away from so many other issues in existence. [16] Some of the opposed felt the video exaggerated or made up facts and inaccurately portrayed the military as well as charitable giving.[17] Others felt they were using the child victims of the LRA for personal gain and argued that Kony had been gone for years and was not the issue on which all attention should be focused. Rather the region could benefit from aid targeted at infrastructure, education, and health. [18] Invisible Children has also been vilified for its “armchair criticism” with some scholars claiming the organization relied too heavily on preaching to people at home on their couches too unmotivated to get up and do something real. Kate Cronin-Furman and Amanda Taub discuss this in a somewhat meta manner. The people criticizing the video claimed Invisible Children was not doing enough to help while they sat at home critiquing this organization who had at least traveled to Uganda and documented the plight. They have stated that “Responsible activism does not shirk accountability from its harms while seeking credit for its successes. Ethical advocates do not insist that others have no right to speak.” Thus they place blame on Invisible Children for its failings but also on critics who shame them when they are at least trying to better the situation.[19]
Ugandan citizens had a largely negative response to Kony 2012 as well. Many gathered in a town park to watch Kony 2012 after its release and the viewing led to citizens throwing stones at organizers in anger. They cited offense at merchandise being sold off their plight and did not feel the film represented their truths. The pure fact that an online film was used when Ugandans themselves did not have internet access is yet another unfortunate angle. Critics felt the film oversimplified matters and ignored the fact that Joseph Kony was long since driven out of Uganda. Victor Ochen, director of the African Youth Initiative Network and survivor of LRA abductions claimed, “the video was definitely not produced for an African audience” and “was not sensitive enough to the victims.”[20] They felt the merchandise and posters made Kony look like some kind of candidate, thus glorifying a villain. They were upset that he was receiving so much attention and called for a ban on the t-shirts in Uganda. Like Cole, they also felt the film focused too much on white saviors and made Africans look helpless. Others took a similar approach, villainizing the United States. A publication of the African People’s Socialist Party published criticism of Kony 2012 claiming it was created to encourage President Obama to “dominate Africa” using a “lynch mob” mentality against Joseph Kony. They referred to Americans as “Tarzan” and claimed there was “no genuine friendship between oppressed nation and oppressor nation.” [21] They cited US involvement in the 1990s genocide and claimed the US was looking to continue its imperialist ways.
The Kony 2012 film had an especially large impact on high school and college students with a Pew poll claiming 58% of that population had at least heard of the video. [22] It stirred up much hostility and criticism and led to loss of support from much of the youth population who had previously been such a large base. The very idea of releasing a video and using rallies as a main source of income could be viewed as lazy and left much of the actual work up to Africans. It was a risky strategy which in the end backfired as support for their media dwindled. This also led to a huge downsizing in high school and college tours which hurt the organization very much financially. In further controversy ABC News reported in 2012, shortly after the Kony 2012 video was released, that the organizations’ founders were in photos holding guns which some saw to be against its proclamations of peace.[23] They responded to these people claiming “We have supporters from all walks of life and all backgrounds and we’re united under this umbrella.”
There was additional criticism from people who felt the film glorified Joseph Kony and gave him attention, which should have been focused on the victims. Invisible Children responded saying, “By making him [Kony] famous, we will bring his crimes to the light and bring the children who’ve been abducted back home. That’s the goal.” [24] The whole premise of the film-release speaks back to the notion of a non-profit organization trying to take risks to function as the for-profit sector, this idea of course having been their strategy before 2012 as well. Their risk did not pay off as they lost much financial support and were left searching for funds as old methods failed. It did bring them into the spotlight but came at a great cost. They hired a PR consultant but ultimately could not recover from financial woes with all funds raised from the film exhausted within two years of its release. [25] One of the founders, Jason Russell, was arrested in the month of the premiere for psychiatric evaluation after public nudity, the result of a mental breakdown. This was due to the intense criticism facing the decision to create this video, and it was clear change needed to occur. [26]
Transition Period
In 2015, and after eleven years of operation, Invisible Children undersaw restructuring, which they claimed was an attempt to focus on the border region of the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan who they saw as vulnerable due to isolation and lack of governance. Invisible Children issued a statement about their restructuring in which they claimed to be responsible for positive political momentum and for removing three LRA commanders from the battlefield. They also cited improvements in safety and livelihood for those in the region. CEO Ben Keesey claimed they did not expect the organization to last as long as it did and that their biggest regret is that their efforts never led to the capture of Joseph Kony. The aim of the transitional period was to transfer authority to partner groups, and they requested donations for this process. [27]
An article in The Guardian from 2015 written by Ben Keesey, CEO of the Invisible Children Charity, discussed this transition period. Keesey originally got involved with Invisible Children after seeing the film three of his friends had made, “Invisible Children: Rough Cut” in the organization’s early days. He attributed the Obama era bill attempting to stop violence and the deployment of US forces in Uganda to his work and thus claimed the organization was not a failure at all and just needed to refocus. Keesey claimed the charity lost financial viability as the controversy stopped schools from hosting their events as their revenue dropped 81 percent from 2012 to 2013. They tried using grants and bigger donors but ultimately it was not enough even with severe staff cuts. Keesey says they considered just telling the world they had accomplished their goals rather than that they were in a way failing and that there was still much work to be done. Keesey advocated for other NGOs to tell the truth and admit their mistakes. [28]
Ultimately, Keesey and the other leaders agreed that work would be continued by a team of four people who themselves would ultimately hand over many of the programs by the end of 2015 to locals in Central Africa. They denied any idea that they had abandoned their origins or given up in the fight against Joseph Kony’s atrocities but claimed to have restructured in order to expand for greater impact. This would be achieved via direct work with locals in violence prevention, family reunification, and conflict analysis. [29]
New Activism
The Invisible Children website currently lists their mission as working “alongside Central Africa’s most remote and vulnerable communities to help them end violent conflict and recover from its impact.” [30] They are an American organization which claim the largest challenge to this mission is violence, asserting that nothing else is possible without safety. There is clear implication that safety should be a basic right, but that lack of government support and communication systems do not allow for this in many parts of Central Africa. People’s physical safety is at risk but armed groups like the LRA also take part in wildlife poaching and trafficking, taking advantage of the victims’ resources and threatening whole ecosystems. The organization claims to seek the continued dismantling of Joseph Kony’s army but also to fix systemic issues which lead to lack of feeling of overall safety. This differs a bit from pre Kony 2012 activism. It is more general and less reliant on one goal. It also places more focus on working directly with locals and providing them tools to build lasting change.
A lack of means for justice, healing, and reconciliation prevents communities from moving forward. Invisible Children now focuses on the idea that behind every number and statistic is a real human being. They attribute 2,540 attacks, 8,374 abductions, and 3,175 deaths to the LRA in Uganda and beyond since 2008. A life free from violence and exploitation is seen as a real possibility and so the organization seeks to use local leaders and innovation to achieve this end. Specifically, their methods include: crisis mapping and conflict analysis, early warning network, local peace committee development, escapee support and reunification, and media-based sensitization. Ultimately Invisible Children claims to want to work with “incredible community leaders” who have necessary solutions but recognize they will need outside donors to make these come true. [31] This seems to show some understanding of past criticism as they are seemingly involving locals much more so than pre-transition.
The Invisible Children website is designed with numerous opportunities to donate in each section of the site. It also offers places to share the website. It claims “Our role is to listen, follow their lead, and bring the expertise and ingenuity that best compliments theirs” in reference to working with locals. Some of the current goals include ending extreme isolation that leads to violence, reversing the depletion of endangered wildlife, and providing the most vulnerable with tools they need to develop resilience. This will be accomplished through a variety of programs ranging from local peace committees, to media sensitization, scholarships, and outreach events. The website largely glosses over past programs and instead spends the “past” programs section advertising its current work. [32]
All of this helps show how the transition which began in 2014 led to a shift from awareness to action. By 2017 Invisible Children received funds from a Texas Hedge fund and worked to supply civilians with radios to track rebel movements, working with the U.S. Africa Command, Uganda People’s Defense Forces, and UN peacekeepers. [33] Rather than their old focus largely based on humanitarian aid and finding Kony and the LRA, they now treat “intelligence gathering as a core objective and military force as a legitimate avenue of justice.” [34] In March of 2017, Invisible Children had a base in the Congo as well as thirty-six radio stations to hear reports of LRA sightings. Before this, LRA murders and village raids often went unreported and there was no way to warn others they may be next. Thus, this helps citizens and the military to track movements. This also allows civilians to remain somewhat anonymous, to avoid revealing they are helping the military and risk becoming targets. The communications work also helped with personal interplay between citizens, thus benefiting them socially. [35]
In 2017 the US and Ugandan forces ended their hunt for Kony. Uganda began the process of withdrawing 1,500 soldiers from Central African Republic which signaled the end of LRA resistance and the hunt for Kony. They did this claiming the LRA no longer poses a threat. The US also ended its mission to capture or kill Kony and so began turning over their bases to the UN. The UN claims Kony was responsible for 100,000 deaths and 2 million displacements as well as 20,000 child abductions according to UNICEF. Some worried this withdrawal would leave a security vacuum as the LRA was still carrying out abductions on a smaller scale, so on-the-ground activism of the reformed Invisible Children may be crucial. [36]
Conclusion
The organization Invisible Children was founded with noble intentions. The young founders felt a desire to help bring attention to children suffering in Uganda. Such self-proclaimed valiant efforts are often criticized for being self-interested or mismanaged, and so Invisible Children fell prey to the humanitarian trap. Criticism of the organization existed from its early days but heated up after the Kony 2012 release, at which point the organization was forced to embrace its doubters and refocus. This essay has shown the many flaws in Invisible Children as an organization, but also offers hope that external judgements and public backlash can cause charities to rethink and improve. Invisible Children took quite a hit but there is hope that listening to criticism can lead to methods more inclusive of those directly impacted and an overall sounder organization.
This post may have been edited by admin for clarity and length.
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12 Prichard, Andreana. “Unit 1.” University of Oklahoma, 2019, Norman , canvas.ou.edu/courses/165778/pages/lecture-unit-1?module_item_id=2084251.
17 Gilmore, E. K. (2019). The rhetoric of benevolence: Invisible children and the construction of whiteness in philanthropy (Order No. 27542825). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (2309521761). Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2309521761?accountid=12964
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22 Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018, pg. 198. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
26 Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
33 Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
34 Herbert, David G. “Kony 2012: From Guerrilla Marketing to Guerrilla Warfare.” Foreign Policy, 2 Mar. 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/02/kony-2017-from-guerilla-marketing-to-guerilla-warfare-invisible-children-africa/.
35 Herbert, David G. “Kony 2012: From Guerrilla Marketing to Guerrilla Warfare.” Foreign Policy, 2 Mar. 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/02/kony-2017-from-guerilla-marketing-to-guerilla-warfare-invisible-children-africa/.
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6 Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
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11 Testa, Jessica. “Two Years After KONY 2012, Has Invisible Children Grown Up?” BuzzFeed, 9 Mar. 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/two-years-after-kony-2012-has-invisible-children-grown-up.
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15 Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
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21 “Kony 2012 video: a cover for U.S. imperialist theft of African resources.” The Burning Spear, 13 Mar. 2012, www.theburningspear.com/2012/03/kony-2012-video-a-cover-for-u-s-imperialist-theft-of-african-resources.
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25 Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
27 Sanders, Sam. “Organization Behind ‘Kony 2012’ Set To Close Its Doors In 2015.” NPR, 14 Dec. 2014, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/15/370824018/organization-behind-kony-2012-set-to-close-its-doors-in-2015.
28 Keesey, Ben. “Working myself out of a job: lessons from leading Invisible Children.” The Guardian, 17 Dec. 2015, www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/dec/17/working-myself-out-of-a-job-lessons-from-leading-invisible-children.
29 Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
36 Baddorf, Zack. “Uganda ends hunt for warlord Joseph Kony empty-handed.” New York Times, 20 Apr. 2017, www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/uganda-ends-hunt-for-warlord-joseph-kony-empty-handed/.
[1] “About.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[2] “Profile: The Lord’s Resistance Army.” Al Jazeera, News-Africa , 6 May 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011101418364196576.html.
[3] “Our Story.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[4] “About.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[5] Testa, Jessica. “Two Years After KONY 2012, Has Invisible Children Grown Up?” BuzzFeed, 9 Mar. 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/two-years-after-kony-2012-has-invisible-children-grown-up.
[6] Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
[7]> Prichard, Andreana. “Unit 1.” University of Oklahoma, 2019, Norman , canvas.ou.edu/courses/165778/pages/lecture-unit-1?module_item_id=2084251.
[8] Wainaina, Binyavanga. “How to Write About Africa.” Granta, 2 May 2019, granta.com/how-to-write-about-africa/.
[9] Day, Amber. DIY Utopia: Cultural Imagination and the Remaking of the Possible. London, Lexington Books, 2017, p. 231.
[10] Francis, Enjoli, and Felicia Patinkin. “‘Kony 2012’ Charity Invisible Children Addresses Its Critics.” ABC News, 8 Mar. 2012, abcnews.go.com/International/kony-2012-charity-invisible-children-addresses-critics/story?id=15877622.
[11] Testa, Jessica. “Two Years After KONY 2012, Has Invisible Children Grown Up?” BuzzFeed, 9 Mar. 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/two-years-after-kony-2012-has-invisible-children-grown-up.
[12] Prichard, Andreana. “Unit 1.” University of Oklahoma, 2019, Norman , canvas.ou.edu/courses/165778/pages/lecture-unit-1?module_item_id=2084251.
[13] Russell, Jason, director. Kony 2012. 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc.
[14] Sanders, Sam. “Organization Behind ‘Kony 2012’ Set To Close Its Doors In 2015.” NPR, 14 Dec. 2014, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/15/370824018/organization-behind-kony-2012-set-to-close-its-doors-in-2015.
[15] Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
[16] Cole, Teju. “The White-Savior Industrial Complex.” The Atlantic, 21 Mar. 2012, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-white-savior-industrial-complex/254843.
[17] Gilmore, E. K. (2019). The rhetoric of benevolence: Invisible children and the construction of whiteness in philanthropy (Order No. 27542825). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (2309521761). Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2309521761?accountid=12964
[18] Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
[19] Taub, Amanda. Beyond Kony2012. Leanpub, 2012, pg. 19, file:///C:/Users/vanackers/Downloads/beyondkony2012-sample.pdf.
[20] Kagumire, Rosebell, and David Smith. “Kony 2012 video screening met with anger in northern Uganda.” The Guardian, 14 Mar. 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/kony-2012-screening-anger-northern-uganda.
[21] “Kony 2012 video: a cover for U.S. imperialist theft of African resources.” The Burning Spear, 13 Mar. 2012, www.theburningspear.com/2012/03/kony-2012-video-a-cover-for-u-s-imperialist-theft-of-african-resources.
[22] Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018, pg. 198. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
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[25] Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
[26] Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
[27] Sanders, Sam. “Organization Behind ‘Kony 2012’ Set To Close Its Doors In 2015.” NPR, 14 Dec. 2014, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/15/370824018/organization-behind-kony-2012-set-to-close-its-doors-in-2015.
[28] Keesey, Ben. “Working myself out of a job: lessons from leading Invisible Children.” The Guardian, 17 Dec. 2015, www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/dec/17/working-myself-out-of-a-job-lessons-from-leading-invisible-children.
[29] Titeca, Kristof, and Matthew Sebastian. “Why did Invisible Children dissolve?” The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/.
[30] “About.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[31] “Our Work.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[32] “Our Work.” Invisible Children , 2019, invisiblechildren.com/.
[33] Aulgur, Jeff, and Ruth Bernstein. “Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing.” The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership, vol. 8, no. 2, 2018. ProQuest, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/docview/2027726732?accountid=12964.
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[35] Herbert, David G. “Kony 2012: From Guerrilla Marketing to Guerrilla Warfare.” Foreign Policy, 2 Mar. 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/02/kony-2017-from-guerilla-marketing-to-guerilla-warfare-invisible-children-africa/.
[36] Baddorf, Zack. “Uganda ends hunt for warlord Joseph Kony empty-handed.” New York Times, 20 Apr. 2017, www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/uganda-ends-hunt-for-warlord-joseph-kony-empty-handed/.
