Cover image courtesy ofTony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images.
–by Chad Dodd–
Abstract
The International Community Must End the Encampment Model and Invest in Sustainable Development for Refugees.
The Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya was established in 1991 to provide haven for people fleeing civil war in Somalia. Designed as a temporary solution to support 90,000 refugees, the almost three-decade old camps within the Dadaab Refugee Complex far exceed capacity as international support diminishes due to the donors transitioning resources to other crises. This paper argues that Kenya’s extreme policies in violation of international and domestic laws are a “cry-out” to the world not to forget the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa, and that the encampment model for refugee support applies a 1940s solution to 21st Century dynamics. It is time to embrace efforts that provide the refugees freedom of movement and integration into the communities which may result in a higher level of sustainable development for the individual refugee and the local community.
Camp Conception
In 1991, as a result of Somalia’s failing state and widespread civil war, Somalis fled the country, most of whom crossed the border into Kenya. Anticipating tens of thousands of refugees entering Kenya, between October 1991 and June 1992, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established three initial refugee camps: Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera, bringing to life the Dadaab Refugee Complex. The establishment of Ifo 2 came in 2011 due to extreme famine in Somalia resulting in a spike of refugees.[1] The UNHCR lead the international response to this humanitarian crisis per the international mandate that was established in the 1948 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution and the UNHCR Governing Statute of 1951. The Statute provides that the High Commissioner “acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection… and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.”[2] Therefore, the UNHCR lead the efforts with the United Nations General Assembly and international humanitarian organizations in support. Some of these organizations that have been an integral part of humanitarian efforts are: international and national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), the Kenya Red Cross Society, and World Food Programme (WFP) which is the principal provider of food assistance. Also very important is Kenya’s Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, which is the host nation’s counterpart to the UNHCR for asylum and refugee management.[3] At the onset of the crisis, the humanitarian fundraising approached $15 million, which went to the camps.[4]
The concept of the original Dadaab Refugee Complex was that the camps would be temporary and when established, designed to support approximately 90,000 people.[5] With the sustained influx of refugees from neighboring countries, predominately Somalia, the idea that these camps would be temporary and the scope of the project of supporting 90,000 refugees would prove to be naïve. For a more in-depth understanding of life in the Dadaab refugee camps, see this video produced by Deutsche Wells News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxOlp-nmFXg.
Violations of Domestic and International Law
Kenya has been a signatory to several international treaties addressing the rights and protections of refugees. Starting in 1966, Kenya became a member of the 1951 United Nations Conventions Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Although signed in 1969, the Kenya Government did not ratify the Convention until 1992, at the initial phase of the multi-decade refugee crisis it would face.[6] To continue its efforts to support the protections of refugees, Kenya became a signatory to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment.[7] In 2006, Kenya enacted the Refugee Act. Through this Act, Kenya further acknowledged its obligation to the international community for the support of refugees.[8] Although this Act established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) within the Kenya Government, it could essentially be described as a skeleton with no meat, as the UNHCR continued to lead the refugee efforts in Kenya. It was not until 2014 that the DRA took over some of the refugee status determination functions.[9]
Becoming a signatory to international treaties and enacting domestic law for the humane treatment and protection of refugees is noble and essential in such a global crisis. However, if the state sponsored domestic practices do not adhere to the fundamental principles of the statutes, they are irrelevant. From the beginning of the crisis in 1991, the Kenya Government has made many efforts to affect the continued influx of refugees from neighboring countries, especially Somalia. There are three significant actions that the Kenya Government has made or attempted to make to affect the number of refugees within its borders. One such action was the Amendments applied to the 2006 Refugee Act. Section 16A of the Refugee Acts states:
(1) The number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay in Kenya shall not exceed one hundred and fifty thousand persons.
(2) The National Assembly may vary the number of refugees or asylum seekers permitted to be in Kenya.
(3) Where the National Assembly varies the number of refugees or asylum seekers in Kenya, such a variation shall be applicable for a period not exceeding six months only.
(4) The National Assembly may review the period of variation for a further six months. [10]
So, what happens to the refugees already in Kenya that exceed the 150,000 as stated in this Amendment? The result would simply be the forced repatriation of more than 400,000 refugees or those seeking asylum.[11] The language in this Amendment is in direct conflict with the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment, which states, “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”[12] When challenged in court, the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya held that this Amendment was in violation of the principles of non-refoulment.[13] These are the same principles Kenya pledged to uphold as a signatory to international statutes and the 2006 Refugee Act, prior to this failed Amendment.
Another major action taken by the Kenya Government that “stepped on” non-refoulment principles was the threat to close the Daadaab Refugee Complex. There are two fundamental arguments Kenya has made for closing the camps: lack of funding and security threats.[14] The Kenyan leaders believed that it is not the state’s responsibility to absorb these problems. It is the responsibility of the international community to deal with the refugees.[15] As the refugee crisis in Kenya has exceeded more than two and a half decades, the international funding has dramatically reduced with significant effects. As of 2019, 50% of the required budget for the Dadaab Refugee Complex is unfunded; a budget shortfall of $84,350,814.[16] The immediate effect is humanitarian organizations make reductions of goods and services. The World Food Programme had to cut food rations for the refugees by 30%.[17] With infant nutrition as well as that of adults already challenging, these cuts make the crisis even more dire. As the funding continues to decrease, the struggles continue to climb.
The second rationale the Kenya Government provides for closing the Dadaab camps is national security concerns. Kenya has tied the multiple terrorist attacks it had in urban areas with the camps.[18] As Karanja Kibicho, a senior government official, stated, “The Kenyan government’s most pressing constitutional and moral responsibility is to ensure the security of its citizens from the risk of violent attack. Our intelligence and security forces have known for a long time that these camps are a dire threat to our people’s security.”[19] To this point, officials working in the camps have reported to Human Right Watch workers that al-Shabaab has been recruiting Somalia refugees to fight on their behalf since 2006.[20] However, the humanitarian organizations within the camps argue there is little merit to this rationale. As CARE’S Director of Refugee Operations in Kenya stated, “many of these refugees are attempting to escape the same thing: It is sadly ironic that refugees face these stereotypes when they themselves are fleeing terror. Nobody chooses to become a refugee.” What the CARE Director is not addressing is that the extreme conditions over time and the lack of hope make refugees susceptible to al-Shabaab recruitment, not their initial desire to flee terror. He is correct that people do not chose to become refugees. However, when conditions are dire enough and those same conditions are sustained over time, people become vulnerable to outside influences. Factors such as extreme poverty, unemployment, and systemic discrimination, are some of the most widely studied components of al-Shabaab’s recruitment.[21] These are precisely the conditions in the Dadaab Refugee Complex. These conditions coupled with al-Shabaab’s activities within Kenya’s border cannot be simply dismissed.
Although central to Kenya’s argument for closing the camps, the fundamental problem is Kenya’s “blanket approach” to affecting such concerns. The Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi found unconstitutional Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Section 18 of the 2006 Kenya Refugee Act, by forcibly repatriating Somali refugees.[22] The Kenya Government has the right to protect its citizens as evidenced in the deportation of (350) people due to security concerns or violation of Kenya law. [23] However, the government must apply the right level of intelligence analysis and rigor to the process, not simply expelling all refugees.
“Cry Out” to the World
Although the Kenya Government declared the camps would be closed, the extreme approach may have had a very different intent. Although the catastrophic funding deficiencies and significant security concerns are very real, these actions were a “cry-out” to the world that this crisis has been forgotten. As noted by Alasan Senghore, an experienced aid worker with the International Federation of Red Cross within the camps, “Kenya has had to bear both the economic and security burden, while the rest of the world turns a blind eye.”[24] This “blind eye” is driven by international donors focusing on high-profile emergencies while forgetting about enduring crisis within the Horn of Africa.[25] As the international community shifts focus to more high-profile crises, the resources transition as well. It is not surprising that funding shifts to high- profile crises, since the contributions are not “purely altruistic.” Donors historically provide funding to areas they have specific interest in. “Such interests are usually not related to refugee protection per se, but rather emerge from linked issue-areas.”[26] With the more recent refugee crises growing in Europe and the Middle East, resources shift resulting in systematic reductions of goods and service for the Dadaab camps. With a dire situation getting worse due to global competing interests, Kenya’s threats to close the camps was a “signal” to the world not to forget about the refugees that have been encamped there for almost three decades.[27] It was a “cry-out” to remind the international community of the crisis remaining in Kenya.
Failed Encampment Model Requires Change
According to international law, there are three long-term options for refugees:
(1) Apply for resettlement in a third country
(2) Return to the country of origin
(3) Integrate into the country of asylum.
Ironically, none of these are legitimate options for the Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps. Less than 1% of the world’s refugees resettle in a third country.[28] Furthermore, no other states have come forward offering to absorb massive amounts of Somali refugees. This option provides little to no relief for the masses.
The option of returning to the country of origin is not viable in most cases. Although there has been recent success in repatriating refugees back to Somalia, many of the refugees have a dreadful decision between the lack of mobility and no chance at sustainable development or the risks of continued civil war. Furthermore, for many of the refugees, the Dadaab camps are all they know.[29]
Much like resettling in a third country, the ability to integrate in Kenya has been removed as an option. A 2014 amendment to the 2006 Refugee Act mandates that every person applying for refugee status must remain in the camps until the processing of their status is finalized. Furthermore, refugees or asylum seekers are not authorized to leave the camp unless granted permission by the Refugee Camp Officer.[30] In practice, these status application processes appear enduring, while the freedom of movement and employment opportunities are stripped from Somali refugees. The effect of the Amendment to the 2006 Refugee Act made the encampment model in Kenya a permanent fixture, essentially the “world’s largest detention center.”[31] With the establishment of the encampment policy coupled with the failing security and economic dynamics in Somalia, the refugees in the Dadaab camps are at the mercy of international aid; aid that is disappearing.
When addressing the refugee crisis in Kenya, the central part of the problem is camps are “the foundation of the international community’s refugee response strategy.”[32] In fact, it has been this way for more than three-quarters of a century. Kilian Kleinschmidt, an aid worker with UNHCR for 25 years, stated, “We’re doing humanitarian aid as we did 70 years ago after the Second World War. Nothing has changed…we were building camps: storage facilities for people. But the refugees were building a city.”[33] The concept that the encampment model has become a permanent fixture is evident in the fact that more than 10,000 3rd Generation refugees are born in Dadaab camps.[34] With refugees living in these camps for most or all of their lives, they fail to receive adequate nutrition, specialized healthcare and lack employment opportunities. This life is an “assault on human dignity.”[35] Furthermore, the encampment model forces refugees to be dependent on international aid. This model enhances the sustainability of the humanitarian organizations themselves but does not for the refugees. Under the encampment model, refugees will forever be reliant on the aid community. Ironically, the UNHCR and the international community have accepted the model of “humanitarian containment.” The humanitarian organizations and donors continue to support the camps with no significant criticism to the encampment policy.[36] Additionally, the international aid community claimed a monopoly on assistance. This is founded in the perception that the United Nations and NGOs are the sole providers of aid, while refugee are the sole recipients. “Agencies operate according to the norms of charity rather than using a rights-based approach or operating in accordance with the gift-giving norms common in the communities they work.”[37]
In order to truly address the refugee crisis, host nations with support of the international community must enable freedom of movement and access to basic and specialized services. These principles coupled with international donor investments into the communities will enable refugees to become self-sustaining while benefiting the local communities. The refugees will be enabled to live “dignified lives.”[38]
Recognizing the road to success is to get the refugees out of the camps and integrated into the communities, NGOs are looking at alternatives that will sustain the refugees, benefit the host communities and ultimately set conditions for refugees to be independent of humanitarian aid.[39] An example program is the Norwegian Refugee Council supported cash-for-rent program in Irbid, Jordan. Money is provided to local landlords to build multi-storage housing units which creates housing for refugees while helping the local economy. As of 2016, more than 8,700 refugees have been provided housing in 3,800 housing units.[40] A second example program is in Kenya. This program provides a 24-hour safe house for women and children who are in extreme risk of violence. Not only does this program provide essential counseling services, it provides medical and legal assistance as well as a “supportive community.” Furthermore, the program provides a sustainment plan, connecting the recipients with long-term housing and care within the community.[41] These programs are simple examples of when applying aid resources efficiently, the immediate requirements are met, while sustainable development is also addressed.
Conclusion
Faced with a refugee crisis that started in 1991 and is ongoing today, the Kenya Government has faced significant economic and security burdens. With the reduction in international assistance, the Government of Kenya established extreme “blanket” policies toward the control of refugees in violation of both international and domestic law. Their violation of their inherent duty per the United Nations Conventions Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment as well as the Kenyan Refugee Act was a “cry-out” to the international community that the refugee crisis in Kenya could not be forgotten. As the Dadaab Refugee Complex represent a antiquated international strategy toward a refugee crisis, it has shown the long-term camp fixture will never encourage sustainable development. It is time to scrap the encampment model and provide investment solutions to 21st Century dynamics. Investing in sustainable development in the host nation’s local communities to integrate refugees is a more effective method for humanitarian support to a refugee crisis. This approach is the bid for future success.
This post may have been edited by admin for clarity and length.
[1] United Nations, “UN-run camps for Somalia refugees in Kenya enter 20th year of existence,” United Nations News, February 21, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/404012-un-run-camps-somalia-refugees-kenya-enter-20th-year-existence.
[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Note on the Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and His Office,” Division of International Protection, October 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugees-office.html.
[3] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The UN Refugee Agency Kenya: Financial Management Coordination, and Fundraising,” Accessed January 9, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/%ef%bb%bffinancial-requirements-coordination-fundraising.
[4] Alexander Betts, “Kenya:Humanitarian Containment and the Somalis.” Survival Migration Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 144. Accessed January 17, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5cd.12.
[5] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The UN Refugee Agency Kenya: Dadaab Refugee Complex.” Accessed January 4, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/dadaab-refugee-complex.
[6] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya,” Library of Congress, Last Updated June 21, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/kenya.php.
[7] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.”
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Hanibal Goitom, “Kenya: Government’s Attempt to Close Refugee Camps Found Unconstitutional,” Library of Congress, March 8, 2017. http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/kenya-governments-attempt-to-close-refugee-camps-found-unconstitutional.
[11] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.”
[12] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Stephanie Thompson, “The Refugee Crisis You’ve Never Heard Of- And Why It’s About to Get Worse.” World Economic Forum. May 24, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/kenya-refugee-crisis-dadaab.
[15] Alexander Betts, “Kenya: Humanitarian Containment and the Somalis.” Survival Migration Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, 144.
[16] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The UN Refugee Agency Kenya: Funding Update,” Accessed January 4, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/11/Kenya-Funding-Update-06-November-2019-1-1.pdf.
[17] McKenzie, David and Brent Swails. “Sanctuary Without End: The Refugees the World Forgot.” Cable News Network. October 2015. https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/10/world/dadaab-refugees.
[18] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.
[19] Stephanie Thompson, “The Refugee Crisis You’ve Never Heard Of- And Why It’s About to Get Worse.”
[20] Young Hoon Song, “International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee and IDP Camps in Kenya and Sudan.” Journal of International and Area Studies 19, no. 1 (2012): 122. Accessed January 17, 2020
https:// www.jstor.org/stable/43111509.
[21] Greg Hackleton, “Al-Shabaab in Kenya: Cross-Border Attacks and Recruitment. Foreign Brief. May 28, 2019. https://www.foreignbrief.com/security-terrorism/al-shabaab-in-kenya-cross-border-attacks-and-recruitment.
[22] Hanibal Goitom, “Kenya: Government’s Attempt to Close Refugee Camps Found Unconstitutional.”
[23] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.”
[24] Stephanie Thompson, “The Refugee Crisis You’ve Never Heard Of- And Why It’s About to Get Worse.”
[25] Ibid.
[26] Gil Loescher, “A Universal Mandate to Protect: The Challenges of Refugee Protection.” Harvard International Review 31, no. 3 (2009), 46. Accessed January 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/42763321.
[27] Noami Schalit, ed., “The World’s Largest Refugee Camp: What the Future Holds for Dadaab,” The Conversation. December 12, 2017. https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-largest-refugee-camp-what-the-future-holds-for-dadaab-88102.
[28] McKenzie, David and Brent Swails, “Sanctuary Without End: The Refugees the World Forgot.”
[29] Ibid.
[30] Hanibal Goitom, “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.”
[31] Alexander Betts, “Kenya:Humanitarian Containment and the Somalis.” Survival Migration Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, 146.
[32] Sonia Ben Ali and Marilena Hatoupis, “Refugee Camps Are Not the Answer to a Complex Crisis,” The Guardian, June 10, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/jun/10/refugee-camps-urban-dadaab-kakuma-jordan.
[33]Aamna Mohdin, “When Refugee Camps Last Three Generations, We Must Accept They’re Not Going Anywhere,” Quartz, November 30, 2015, https://qz.com/560768/when-refugees-camps-last-three-generations-we-must-accept-theyre-not-going-anywhere.
[34] Aamna Mohdin, “When Refugee Camps Last Three Generations, We Must Accept They’re Not Going Anywhere.”
[35] “Kenya: Forgotten Refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab Camps Appeal for Dignity.” Kenyan Digest. November 19, 2019. https://kenyandigest.com/kenya-forgotton-refugees-in-kenyas-dadaab-camps-appeal-for-dignity.
[36] Alexander Betts, “Kenya: Humanitarian Containment and the Somalis.” Survival Migration Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, 146-149.
[37] Cindy Horst. “A Monopoly on Assistance: International Aid to Refugee Camps and the Neglected Role of the Somali Diaspora.” Africa Spectrum 43, no. 1 (2008), 123. Accessed January 17, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175225.
[38] “Kenya: Forgotten Refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab Camps Appeal for Dignity.”
[39] Sonia Ben Ali and Marilena Hatoupis, “Refugee Camps Are Not the Answer to a Complex Crisis.”
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
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